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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Note should also be taken of the Supreme Court decision in
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company v. Art Insti-
tute of Chicago, 7 a holding which permitted the introduction of




Judicial construction of a statute conferring power upon an
administrative tribunal can either limit or expand the extent of
the discretion which an agency may exercise. The case of People
ex rel. Schoenebaum v. Department of Registration1 is an example
of the first of these propositions. In that case, the problem before
the court was one concerning the extent of power in the Depart-
ment to grant, or to withhold, a medical license for an individual
who was already authorized to practice medicine in another
country. The statute permitted the Department, in its discretion,
to issue a license to one already licensed elsewhere upon evidence
the applicant met certain conditions. 2 The applicant in question
had been educated and licensed in Germany. He subsequently
emigrated to the United States and, in due course, became a
naturalized citizen. On two occasions, he had applied for a license
under the reciprocity provision but his application had been de-
niedA He then submitted to written medical examinations on
seven separate occasions. Each time, he failed to obtain a satis-
factory passing grade. Having once more applied for permission
to practice under the reciprocity provision, and having been again
refused permission, he caused mandamus proceedings to be insti-
tuted.
87409 Ill. 481, 100 N. E. (2d) 625 (1951), affirming 341 Ill. App. 624, 94 N. E.
(2d) 602 (1950). The case has been noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 96
and 180, and in 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 925.
1346 I. App. 26, 104 N. E. (2d) 662 (1952).
2 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 4. The statute enumerates the precise
conditions to be observed.
3 This fact does not appear in the court's statement of the case but is disclosed
in the abstract of the record and the briefs filed in the case.
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In its answer, the Department admitted that the applicant
had met all of the conditions set out in the statute but justified
its refusal upon a departmental rule of long standing which pro-
vided that one who failed a written examination could not there-
after take advantage of the privilege of reciprocity. The trial
court ruled in favor of the applicant and the Appellate Court for
the First District affirmed on the ground the regulation operated
to impose additional conditions not provided for in the particular
statute and was, therefore, an unreasonable one. The holding
would be indisputably clear but for the fact the statute contains
a phrase to the effect that the department "may in its discretion"
issue a license without examination. The denial of the existence
of a discretion in the matter was an obvious flying into the teeth
of plain statutory language to the contrary. If the court felt that
the discretion exercised was unreasonable, it did not have to curb
statutory powers the way it did. It could merely have stated that
the particular decision was improper, thereby justifying reversal.
By taking an extreme position, the court has now unnecessarily
limited the power granted by the legislature.
The necessity for a notice and hearing prior to administrative
action may rest upon a constitutional or a statutory requirement.
In Hornstein v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission,4 the Illinois
Supreme Court was required to determine whether either statute
or constitution made it necessary that a holder of a liquor license
be accorded a hearing before initial revocation of his license
occurred. The county commissioner there revoked the plaintiff's
liquor license at an ex parte hearing. On appeal to the state com-
mission, 5 the local commissioner's decision was affirmed. The
circuit court of the county, on review of the administrative action,
reversed, but it, in turn, was reversed by the Supreme Court.
The main contention turned on whether or not the initial revoca-
tion was void since it had not been preceded by a hearing. Plain-
tiff urged that the liquor control statute contained certain provi-
4 412 Ill. 365, 106 N. E. (2d) 354 (1952).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 94, provides that an individual whose
license has been revoked by a local commission may appeal to the Illinois Liquor
Control Commission which is then to hear the case de novo.
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sions indicating a legislative intent to require such a hearing.
Even if it did not, the due process clause of the state constitution
was said to make a hearing necessary before administrative ac-
tion. There being no express statutory requirement for a hearing
prior to initial revocation, an implied requirement was said to
rest in the fact that the license could be revoked only 'for cause,"I
presupposing a hearing to establish the necessary "cause," and
also in the fact the local commissioner was authorized to examine
the licensee and to issue subpoenas.
The Supreme Court, however, was not impressed. Noting
that whenever the legislature had intended to require a hearing
the requirement had been explicitly stated,6 the court felt the
silence was significant. It answered the constitutional argument
that procedural due process required a prior notice and hearing
by adopting the classical approach which treats a liquor license as
a mere privilege, not a property right, therefore not protected by
the due process clause.
7
Again, during the year, the court was confronted with prob-
lems arising under the provisions of the Illinois Administrative
Review Act. Two of these cases involved the statutory require-
ment that, in any action to review any final decision of an admin-
istrative agency, "the administrative agency and all other per-
sons, other than the plaintiff, who are parties of record to the
proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made de-
fendants. ' 's The first decision, that of Moline Tool Company v.
Department of Revenue,9 settled a troublesome situation which
6 Thus, where revocation proceedings are instituted by a private citizen, a hear-
ing is expressly required: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 151. The same thing
is true upon an appeal from a local commission decision to the state commission:
ibid., § 153.
7 The case also decided that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 153, which states
that a failure of a licensee to submit to examination would constitute an admission
that he had violated the provisions of the Act and therefore provided ground for
revocation, did not violate the plaintiff's right against self-incrimination. The
court pointed out that plaintiff could remain silent if he so desired. The fact that
the silence might result in a revocation of the liquor license was deemed to be of
no consequence since the plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to a license in
the first place.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 271.
9 410 Ill. 35, 101 N. E. (2d) 71 (1951).
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had been created by unfortunate language contained in an earlier
Supreme Court opinion. In that case, the plaintiff had filed a
claim for a refund of certain retailers' occupational taxes which
claim had been denied by the Department. In a suit brought by
the taxpayer to review that decision, the Department of Revenue
was designated as defendant. It thereupon contested jurisdiction
on the ground the action was really a suit against the state and
was prohibited by the state constitution.' The trial court dis-
missed the complaint but, on direct appeal to the Supreme Court
because a constitutional question was involved, the decision was
reversed and the cause was remanded.
To achieve that result, the court was forced to repudiate
certain language which had appeared in its opinion in the case of
Krachock v. Department of Revenue." There, although not neces-
sary to the actual decision, the court had said: "It may be noted
at this point that the defendant is 'Department of Revenue.' The
Department of Revenue is an arm of the state and may not be
sued, because the Constitution of Illinois provides that the state
shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."12
Confusion resulted therefrom for, while the court denied the
plaintiff's right to name the Department as a defendant, it did
not supply an answer to the question as to who should be named.
That confusion has now, fortunately, been abated with the instant
conclusion that an action designed to obtain a judicial review of
a decision by a governmental agency does not fall within the
constitutional prohibition. As, in such a proceeding, there would
be no attempt to impose liability upon the state or its agency in
any form, there could be no encroachment upon sovereign im-
munity.
13
Another problem regarding the naming of defendants was
10 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 26.
11403 Il. 148, 85 N. E. (2d) 682 (1949).
12403 I1. 148 at 153, 85 N. E. (2d) 682 at 685.
18 The court's conclusion would appear to be buttressed by the fact that, prior to
the enactment of the Administrative Review Act, agency decisions were reviewable
by means of common law or statutory certiorari and these writs were always
lddressed to the state agency and the court never objected to such a practice:
Snite v. Department of Revenue, 398 Ill. 41, 74 N. E. (2d) 877 (1947).
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involved in Cuny v. Annunzio. 14 A claimant had filed for unem-
ployment compensation and the deputy processing the claim had
made a favorable award. The employer, having exhausted all
administrative remedies, then filed a complaint under the Admin-
istrative Review Act naming the Director of Labor as the sole
defendant. A motion to dismiss that proceeding, for failure to
join the Board of Review and the claimant, was passed over in
the trial court when it upheld the review board's decision on the
merits. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to consider the merits
of the appeal from that judgment but decided that the motion to
dismiss should have been allowed. It reached that conclusion on
the basis that an adverse ruling by the court on appeal would
deprive the claimant of compensation and would, therefore, mate-
rially affect her interests. Being a necessary and indispensable
party, as well as a party of record, she should have been named
in the complaint.
Perhaps the most interesting and significant portion of the
decision involves the court's conclusion that the Board of Review
of the Department of Labor should have been named as defendant
and not merely the Director of Labor.15 The plaintiff argued that
the Board was not an independent administrative agency but
was merely an arm of the Department of which Annunzio was the
head. The court admitted this but pointed out that the Adminis-
trative Review Act contemplated that the board or individual
who entered the administrative decision was the appropriate de-
fendant and this whether the party named was the actual head of
the department or not. Of course, if the Director of Labor had
made the final decision, as he may do in certain proceedings,1" the
conclusion would be inescapable that he would have been an
14 411 111. 613, 104 N. E. (2d) 780 (1952).
15 The court failed to comment upon whether the Director of Labor was also a
necessary party defendant, being content to state that the Board of Review should
have been named. Absence of discussion on this particular point creates an addi-
tional problem. The section of the Unemployment Compensation Act authorizing
the review of decisions thereunder by means of a proceeding pursuant to the
Illinois Administrative Review Act stipulates that in such actions the Director of
Labor shall be "deemed" a party: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 520. Does
this mean that the Director must be named as a party in the pleadings, or does he
automatically become such under this provision without a specific joining?
16 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 225(b).
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appropriate defendant. The holding, however, generates ques-
tions which are, as yet, unanswered. If the statute creates a
specifically named board or administrator within an executive
department to make determinations and decisions, that board or
administrator would have to be named as a defendant. If, on the
other hand, the statute fails to designate any particular officer to
be the final arbiter, thereby making the determinations of the
agency into anonymous departmental decisions,'1 7 would the mere
naming of the department as defendant be sufficient? The practi-
tioner may well encounter difficulties in determining whom to
name in his efforts to comply properly with the Administrative
Review Act.
Even the most cursory reading of that statute should, how-
ever, make it obvious that it contemplates no more than a review
of the record formulated during the administrative hearing, for
the statute expressly states that the record is to be filed with the
court and prohibits the introduction of new evidence.' 8 It is,
therefore, surprising to find that an Illinois court would, upon an
appeal from an administrative decision, allow a de novo hearing
of the issues. This, however, is exactly what did occur in the case
of Strohi v. Macon County Zoning Board of Appeals.'9 The
plaintiff had requested a rezoning of property but this was denied
by the zoning board of appeals. A proceeding under the Adminis-
trative Review Act was then filed in the circuit court and the
complaint, in conformity with the statute, requested that the record
of the proceedings before the board be filed. From then on, how-
ever, the specific requirements of the statute were totally ignored.
No record, if there was any, was filed and the trial court, appar-
ently with the acquiescence of everyone involved, held a de novo
hearing. Since constitutional issues were involved, an appeal was
taken directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. One should have
little' difficulty imagining the surprise of the justices of that
17 Much of the power delegated to the Department of Revenue, for instance, is
delegated without the placing of responsibility for its exercise in any particular
officer or commission within the department.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, VoL 2, Ch. 110, §§ 270 and 274.
19 411 Ill. 559, 104 N. E. (2d) 612 (1952).
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court on being asked to review a record, first made in the trial
court, in a proceeding of that character. As this procedure so
clearly violated the specific provisions of the statute, the Supreme
Court promptly disposed of the case by remanding it with a
direction to determine whether an administrative record existed.
If one did exist, the trial court was to review it. If one did not,
the decision of the zoning board of appeals was to be reversed
for failure to make a record.
CONFUC0T OF LAWS
One case in the field of conflict of laws is noteworthy, not so
much for its novelty as for its function in calling attention to the
fact that the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act has
been embodied in the Illinois Evidence Act.20 In the case of
Commercial Credit Corporation v. Fatz,21 the Appellate Court
for the First District held that a conditional sale contract validly
executed and recorded in the state of Kentucky, pursuant to the
Uniform Sales Act of that jurisdiction, had to be enforced, as
against a local bona fide purchaser without notice following a
removal of the property into this state without the consent of the
conditional vendor. Although the defendant had argued that the
law of Kentucky had not been properly presented, the court held
the objection to be without merit because, under the Illinois
statute, the local court was required to take judicial notice of the
Kentucky Sales Act.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Eighteen cases involving attacks on Illinois statutes for varied
constitutional reasons were considered during this survey period
but in only three instances were the attacks successful. The
grounds asserted ranged from claimed violations of guarantees
in favor of religious freedom to the setting up of arbitrary and
capricious schemes of classification.
The general police power was relied upon, by the Supreme
20 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, §§ 48a-48n.
21 346 Ill. App. 541, 105 N. E. (2d) 789 (1952).
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Court, to sustain certain credit restrictions imposed on liquor
dealers 22 which had been challenged in the case of Weisberg v.
Taylor.23 It also, in Downey v. Grimshaw,24 reached the conclusion
that no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power had been
made by the variation section of the Zoning Act.25  The court
there noted that the rule of Welty v. Hamilton26 could not be
applied because, at the time of that case, the statute contained
no provision for the granting of a variation by corporate authori-
ties.
Questions concerning separation of powers, advanced under
Article III of the state constitution, were presented in two cases.
In the first, that of Board of Education v. Nickell,27 the criticism
was directed against some sections of the School Code 28 which
transferred authority over district changes from the county
superintendent to the county judge, but the court found no viola-
tion to exist. In the second, that of Agran v. Checker Taxi Com-
pany,29 however, the legislative addition of certain notice require-
ments to the Civil Practice Act30 in relation to the dismissal of
civil proceedings for failure to prosecute were said to infringe
upon the inherent power of the judiciary.
Use of the public credit for the benefit of private individuals,
prohibited since an early day in the history of this state,," formed
the basis of the challenge directed against other sections of the
School Code32 intended to restore pension payments previously
taken away from retired public school teachers. In Krebs v.
Board of Trustees of Teachers' Retirement System,83 the attack
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 122.
23409 Iii. 384, 100 N. F). (2d) 748 (1951), noted in 1 DePaul L. Rev. 287.
24 410 Ill. 21, 101 N. E. (2d) 275 (1951).
25 ni1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 73.4.
26 344 Ill. 82, 76 N. E. 333 (1931).
27410 Ill. 98, 101 N. E. (2d) 438 (1951).
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 8-6 and § 8-7.
29412 Il. 145, 105 N. E. (2d) 713 (1952), noted in 30 CHIOAOo-KENT LAw REvI:w
383.
30 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(5) and § 174(a).
3' II1. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 20, is a reiteration of a prohibition first adopted in
Ill. Const. 1848, Art. III, § 38.
32 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 25.50 and § 25.55-1.
33 410 i1. 435, 102 N. E. (2d) 321 (1951).
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in question failed when the Supreme Court, upholding the statute,
said the restoration of benefits was founded upon a moral obliga-
tion, hence involved no more than an expenditure of public funds
for a public purpose.
8 4
Claims of interference with religious freedoms 35 were ad-
vanced in two instances. A self-denominated faith healer, who
had been convicted of violating the Medical Practice Act, 6 failed
to substantiate his claims, in People v. Handzik, 7 when the court
affirmed the conviction saying that bona fide faith healers were
specifically exempted from the operation of the statute. 8 In the
other case, that of People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,8 9 a parent
sought to prevent the administration of a vitally needed blood
transfusion to his child, also on religious grounds, but failed
because the interest of the state, as parens patriae, was said to
override even the guarantee of religious freedom. Although the
question had become moot prior to argument, the court noted that
the issue was of such substantial interest as to warrant an excep-
tion to the general rule against writing opinions in moot cases.
Several cases dealt with aspects of due process of law, thereby
providing occasion for re-examination of fundamental federal and
state constitutional provisions.4 0 In three of these instances, the
question was generated in the course of a criminal prosecution
but proved to be successful in only one. Thus, in People v. Gar-
man,41 the defendant claimed that the so-called "reckless homi-
cide"I statute4 2 was defective in that it failed to define the crime
sufficiently to be identifiable by an average citizen, but the Supreme
Court thought otherwise. Much the same argument was offered
in People v. Beauharnais43 by way of challenge to the provisions
34 See Hagler v. Small, 307 Ill. 460, 138 N. E. 849 (1923).
85 U. S. Const., Amend. 1; Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 3.
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 161.
37410 Ill. 295, 102 N. U. (2d) 340 (1951).
38 II. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 16v.
39411 11. 618, 104 N. D. (2d) 769 (1952), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 575. Certiorari
has been denied.
40 U. S. Const., Amend. 14; Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2.
41411 11. 279, 103 N. E. (2d) 636 (1952).
42 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 364a.
43 408 Ill. 512, 97 N. E. (2d) 343 (1951).
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of the Criminal Code regarding criminal libel.44 Following state
court affirmance of the conviction therein, the United States
Supreme Court, on certiorari, while divided five to four, reached
much the same conclusion although the majority expressed some
doubts as to the wisdom underlying the statute. 45 A section of the
Illinois version of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act" was, how-
ever, held to be unconstitutional in People v. Levin.47 Due process
requirements were there deemed violated because of an inadequate
reference to the penalty clause in the title to the statute.48
Due process elements were also involved in civil cases. Men-
tion has been made elsewhere of the holding of the case of Grasse
v. Dealers' Transport Company4 9 which declared certain parts
of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act 5 to be unconsti-
tutional. Attention should also be given to the notice and hear-
ing problem raised in Hornstein v. Illinois Liquor Control Com-
mission.51 The court there held that no constitutional violation
had occurred in the conduct of a summary liquor license revoca-
tion proceeding, even though the same had been conducted with-
out notice.
Most of the criticism advanced during the year, however,
turned on matters of classification. In Chatkin v. University of
Illinois,52 for example, the claim was propounded that certain
distinctions made, license-wise, under the 1943 Public Accountants
Act 8 were invalid. That statute drew a distinction between
those accountants who, prior to its adoption, had obtained their
licenses by examination and those who had been granted a license
44 II. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 402 et seq.
45 See 343 U. S. 250, 72 S. Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed. 919 (1952). Justices Black, Reed,
Douglas and Jackson each wrote a dissenting opinion.
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 1211/2, § 183.
47412 Ill 11, 104 N. E. (2d) 814 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAW R V=w
387.
48 See Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
49412 Il. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), note in 30 Cm0AGo-KENT LAw RrIFw
375. See also discussion herein, Division I, Workmen's Compensation, notes 46-50.
50 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §138.5. The case actually arose under Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1949, Ch. 48, § 166.
51412 Ill. 365, 106 N. E. (2d) 354 (1952). The case Is more fully discussed above,
under the topic of Administrative Law, notes 4 to 7.
52 411 Ill. 105, 103 N. E. (2d) 498 (1952).
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 1101/Y2, § 28.
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merely by reason of having a specified number of years of ex-
perience as such. The classification scheme was charged with
being an arbitrary one, thereby making the examination provi-
sions unlawful. The attack failed, for the Supreme Court found
a reasonable basis for the distinction but, even if one had not
been present, the matter had been rendered moot by a recent
amendment to the statute.
5 4
In another classification case, that of Gaca v. City of Chi-
cago,55 the attack was directed against a section of the revised
Cities and Villages Act,56 one which provides for indemnity in
favor of certain police officers who may have inflicted injury on
person or property while engaged in the performance of their
duties. A majority of the Supreme Court found the classification
to be based on a substantial difference, but the dissenting judges
stated they could see no greater chance for the causing of neg-
ligen injury in a large city than in a smaller one. The dissent
would appear to have reached a conclusion more nearly in ac-
cord with established rules for statutory construction.
Two school cases might also be mentioned. The plaintiff in
People v. Loitz,57 questioning the legal existence of a certain
school district, contended that the School Survey Act,5 s under
which the school district had been created, was invalid because
of an arbitrary division between communities having less than,
and more than, five hundred inhabitants, as well as for an alleged
improper delegation of legislative power. The statute was sus-
tained, first because the court could see a proper recognition of
differences between rural and urban areas, and second, because
the survey committee possessed advisory powers only with the
ultimate decision being left in the hands of the voters. The at-
tack in Scofield v. Board of Education59 more nearly concerned
54 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 1102, § 28(2) (b) and § 28(2) (c).
55411 III. 146, 103 N. E. (2d) 617 (1952), noted in 1 DePaul L. Rev. 306.
Schaeffer and Hershey, JJ., jointly dissented in one opinion.
56 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-15.
57412 M. 313, 106 N. E. (2d) 338 (1952).
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 713 et seq.
59 411 Ill. 11, 103 N. E. (2d) 640 (1952).
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voting rights in connection with the establishment of a school
district. It was there claimed that a portion of the School Code °
was invalid for failure to enumerate the qualifications required
of voters. The court indicated the sections in question were not
intended to set up different qualifications for voters at school
elections but were added merely for the purpose of bringing all
statutory provisions regarding school elections into one conven-
ient place.
Other minor points are worth brief notice. An attempt to
enjoin the enforcement of the Illinois Optometric Practice Act,6 '
predicated on the theory the various sections thereof bore no
definite relation to the end sought to be subserved, was defeated in
Klein v. Department of Registration and Education.62 The Hospi-
tal District Law68 was sustained in People ex rel. Royal v. Cain
6 4
although it was there contended that the statute contravened the
state constitution in a host of ways. For that matter, the attack
on the 1151 amendments to the Motor Vehicle Act,65 which had
provided for a considerable increase in the cost of licensing trucks,
experienced no better fate.6
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
While certain aspects of the case of Michigan Boulevard
Building Company v. Chicago Park District67 have been covered
elsewhere in this survey,68 some repetition would be proper for
the case also deals with a matter of vital concern to municipal
authorities. The expanded flow of automobile traffic and the need
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 5A-1 et seq.
61 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 105.1 et seq.
62412 Ill. 75, 105 N. U. (2d) 758 (1952).
63111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 163.30 et seq.
64410 Ill. 39, 101 N. E. (2d) 74 (1951).
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95/2, §§ 9, 11a and 20.
66 See Co-ordinated Transport, Inc. v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 321, 106 N. E. (2d) 510
(1952), and Bode v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 204, 106 N. U. (2d) 521 (1952). The last
mentioned case involved an interesting element in that the taxpayer who had sued
to enjoin the department from disbursing public funds was not personally or
directly affected by the statutory provisions in question. On that point, see Krebs
v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. (2d) 761 (1944).
67412 Ill. 350, 106 N. E. (2d) 359 (1952).
68 See Division VI, Property, notes 6 to 11.
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for providing parking space, led the Chicago Park District to seek
an enabling act from the state legislature authorizing the construc-
tion of a downtown underground garage. Following the enact-
ment of such a statute,0 attack was made thereon, not only as to
whether it purported to authorize a proper corporate purpose but
also because it was said to involve special legislation and a
pledging of public revenue to finance the necessary construction.
All issues were decided favorably to the Park District and a decree
dismissing the complaint was affirmed, the upper court noting
that the term "park purposes" was not a static concept but would
respond to current and changing uses. The decision should prove
helpful to other congested areas of the state.
In much the same way, the case of Gaca v. City of Chicago,70
while primarily devoted to matters of constitutional law, is worthy
of notice here. The suit was one by a police officer to recover an
amount he had been forced to pay on a judgment rendered against
him in favor of certain persons whom he had falsely arrested.
The action was based on a provision to be found in the Cities and
Villages Act,71 one with a checkered history,72 peculiarly appli-
cable only to the City of Chicago. The municipality, by way of
defense, questioned the constitutionality of the section in question
on the ground that it was special legislation. Its failure to succeed
on that point very naturally led to affirmance of a judgment for
the police officer, for the case came squarely within the statute.
The holding may, however, foreshadow other even more interest-
ing developments as the right to indemnity is supposedly limited
to cases wherein the injury has arisen by non-wilful misconduct
on the part of the police officer. It has been suggested before,
and it may be worth repeating again, that, if protection is to be
provided for persons injured by acts of police officers, the most
direct remedy would be to abolish the doctrine of governmental
immunity.
69 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 105, § 333.23b et seq.
70411 Ill. 146, 103 N. E. (2d) 617 (1952).
71 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-15.
72 See comment on the case of Both v. Collins, 339 Ill. App. 437, 90 N. E. (2d)
285 (1950), in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 189 and 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
REvrEw 114.
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TAXATION
The decision of the Supreme Court in the tax case of People
ex rel. Marsters v. Missionaries78 is less surprising in result than
interesting as an example of judicial application of a statutory
provision the intendment of which is abundantly clear, but the
structure and wording of which is fraught with difficulty.7 4 The
court was there called upon to determine whether or not certain
real property owned by a religious corporation, and used for
various educational, religious and residential purposes, was ex-
empt from real property taxes under the provisions of Section 19
of the Illinois Revenue Act.7 5 The premises were intended to
be used, and in fact were used during approximately nine months
of the year, primarily as a seminary where a course of instruction
was given approximately equal to high school and three years of
an undergraduate college. In addition to the general educational
curriculum, several hours of each day were devoted to the moral
training of the students. The instruction and administration was
furnished primarily by priests and nuns who received no com-
pensation for their work but were furnished lodging and food on
the premises. A portion of the premises was used for the housing
of visiting lecturers and instructors, as well as for lay visitors
and guests. During the summer months, when the seminary was
not in session, the entire premises were apparently used for "re-
treats" or religious assemblies. The retreatants were neither re-
quired nor requested to make payment for such use, although they
did frequently make voluntary contributions to the seminary,
which contributions were used solely for its support.
Out of the rather long and cumbersome provisions of the
applicable statutory section, only two subsections were pertinent;
one exempting "all property used exclusively for religious pur-
poses, or used exclusively for school and religious purposes .
and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit," and an-
73409 Ill. 370, 99 N. E. (2d) 186 (1951), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 132.
74 See School of Domestic Arts and Science v. Carr, 322 Ill. 562, 153 N. E. 669
(1926).
75 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 500.
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other exempting "all property of institutions of public charity,
all property of beneficent and charitable organizations . . . when
such property is actually and exclusively used for such charitable
or beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a
view to profit." With reference to the housing of the instructors
and administrators, the court was confronted at the outset with
its prior holdings to the effect that a parsonage 76 and a residence
occupied rent-free by a teacher in a parochial school 77 were
used primarily for housing purposes so not exempt by reason of
their relationship to religious institutions. The court, however,
surmounted this difficulty by pointing out that the housing accom-
modations in the instant case were not merely incidental to the
conduct of the exempt activity, but constituted rather "the direct
application of the" property "to the accomplishment of the pri-
mary purpose for which the seminary exists." It also held that
the term "exclusively," as used in the quoted subsections, should
be construed as if it read "primarily."
This left the matter of the summer use of the premises for
retreat purposes to be surmounted. The court might well have
held, consistent with its holding that "exclusively" means "pri-
marily," that an exemption would exist upon the ground the prem-
ises were used "for school and religious purposes" with the sum-
mer use for retreats and the like being a mere incident thereto.
Instead, it predicated the exemption upon the sweeping provi-
sions of subsection 7 of Section 19, treating the property to be
that of a beneficent and charitable organization "actually and
exclusively used for such charitable or beneficent purposes."
It may be that the court realized the implications which might have
arisen had it predicated the exemption on the other subsection.
To have held that the premises would be exempt because used
nine months in the year for the religious, or for school and re-
ligious purposes, would have left the matter of use during the
remaining three months open to wholly unrelated purposes. It
76 First Congregational Church v. Board of Review, 254 Il. 220, 98 N. E. 275
(1912).
77 St. John Congregation v. Board of Appeals, 357 Ill. 69, 191 N. E. 282 (1935).
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may, therefore, have envisioned the presentation of a future case
in which the unrelated and non-exempt uses might have consti-
tuted an even larger portion of the total use.
In the foregoing case, the question of exemption was raised
in the customary manner by filing objections in the county court.
A reverse situation is presented in the case of Goodyear Rubber
Company v. Tierney7s where the plaintiff sought to assert an
exemption by means of a declaratory judgment proceeding but
was held to be precluded from such remedy because a more cus-
tomary statutory remedy was available. 79  The plaintiff, lessee
of property owned by the federal government, had urged that the
assessment was against the fee interest, whereas the defendant
had contended that the assessment was made against the lease-
hold interest of the plaintiff, as permitted under Section 26 of
the Revenue Act.80 The court, holding that a suit for declaratory
judgment could not be maintained, distinguished the cases in-
volving the use of an injunction, offered by the plaintiff by way
of analogy, as being applicable only where the property was totally
exempt or where the tax had already been assessed and con-
structive fraud was present. This resolution of a question here-
tofore unanswered in Illinois was made in accordance with the
general weight of authority throughout the country."'
VIII. TORTS
Save for those torts cases which have been more appropriately
discussed in connection with other sections of this survey,' no
cases of transcendental importance arose during the year in that
78411 Ill. 421, 104 N. E. (2d) 222 (1952), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 535.
79 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 675, provides for the payment of taxes
under protest and for objection in the county court.
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 507, provides: "When real estate which
is exempt from taxation is leased to another whose property is not exempt, and
the leasing of which does not make the real estate taxable, the leasehold estate
and the appurtenances shall be listed as the property of the lessee thereof, or his
assignee, as real estate."
8' See, for example, Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 A. 265 (1925). See also
Borcbard, Declaratory Judgments, 2d Ed., pp. 320 and 342.
1 See Division I for tort cases growing out of the master-servant relationship;
Division V for those connected with the family; and Division VI regarding wrongs
arising from property.
